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Law, Narrative, and the Continuing Colonialist Oppression of Native Hawaiians
ABSTRACT
The article does three things. First, and for the first time, it brings to bear the
perspectives of critical race theory, postcolonial theory, and narrative theory on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Rice v. Cayetano, which dealt a severe blow to Native
Hawaiians’ struggles for redress and reparations for a century of dispossession and
impoverishment at the hands of the United States. Second, it demonstrates in the
concrete case of Hawaii the power of a particular historical narrative—when it is
accepted uncritically by the Supreme Court—to render the law itself into an instrument of
colonial domination. Third, it links important postcolonial writers—Edward Said, Albert
Memmi, and Ngugi wa Thiong’o—to contemporary discourse in critical race theory and
the narrative aspects of law.
The history of the Hawaiian Islands is a far cry from the idyllic, palm fringed beaches of
the travel posters. It is a story of domination and dispossession of an indigenous society.
The article shows how Western historians have tried to erase this story, and put in its
place a story of the civilizing influences of Western missionaries and traders, who
brought modern technology and democratic government to a primitive people. This story
played a pivotal role in the Rice opinion, enabling the Supreme Court to ignore and evade
the U.S. government’s own apology to the Native Hawaiians for the loss of their
sovereignty as a result of colonialist policies of the United States. The article further
demonstrates how the Court, in addition to suppressing the historical record, adhered
woodenly to the fiction of the colorblindness of American law to find that the
requirement of Native Hawaiian ancestry to vote for the trustees of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The article concludes with three strategies of resistance to law as an instrument of
colonial power that apply in the Hawaiian case. These are: to reclaim the native voice in
the law at both the trial and appellate level; to deepen and extend criticism of “the law is
colorblind”; and to pursue Native Hawaiian self-determination through mechanisms of
international law.
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The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when
it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and
work on it, who kept it going, who won it back, and who now
plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even
for a time decided in narrative. …The power to narrate, or to
block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very
important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the
main connections between them.
Edward W. Said1
The conquest of the earth is not a pretty thing when you look
into it too much.
Robert A. Williams, Jr. (after Joseph Conrad)2

Stories shape history; compare two narratives of contemporary Hawaii. The first
celebrates Hawaii as a land of multiracial harmony, as depicted by a white resident of
Hawaii—a retired high school mathematics teacher and former university professor from
Massachusetts—in his testimony in 2000 before the Hawaii Advisory Committee of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights:
[O]ver the last 20 years or so, there has been a powerful resurgence
of Hawaiian culture and that has taken place under the auspices of
the existing governmental system where all people have equal
rights under the law. …There are many, many different cultures in
Hawaii. All of us are in the minority here. The various cultures of
immigrants have done quite well in maintaining and preserving
their culture, and the Hawaiian renaissance of the last 20 years has
been extraordinarily powerful.3
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The second offers a Native Hawaiian’s view of the “renaissance” of her people:
In our subjugation to American control, we have suffered what other
displaced, dislocated people, such as the Palestinians and the Irish of
Northern Ireland, have suffered: We have been occupied by a colonial
power whose every law, policy, cultural institution, and collective
behavior entrench foreign ways of life in our land and on our people.
From the banning of our language and the theft of our sovereignty to
forcible territorial incorporation in 1959 as a state of the United States,
we have lived as a subordinated Native people in our ancestral home.4
The breathtaking contrast between these narratives illustrates a present-day
contest in the Hawaiian Islands that is not simply over the accurate portrayal of the
islands’ recent past, but over land, power, and the survival of an indigenous culture.
Today’s Native Hawaiians are descendants of the people who occupied the Hawaiian
Islands from c. 500 A.D. They developed a flourishing, self-governing culture and
society prior to the main European contacts that began in 1778. This culture came under
the total domination of Western economic and political interests after 1778, culminating
in the overthrow of the independent Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893 by American business
interests acting with the support of United States troops. The United States annexed
Hawaii as a Territory of the United States in 1898, and admitted it as the fiftieth State in
1959.
This paper will show how the relationship between narrative and power has
undermined present-day Native Hawaiians’ efforts to win legal recognition of their
political and economic rights as reparation for the American takeover. What Edward
Said terms the “power to narrate” has operated at two levels in Hawaii. At one level,
Native Hawaiians’ self-definition and cultural identity have suffered displacement in a
historical record that privileges English-language sources, Western canons of historical
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evidence, and the rhetoric of “white man’s burden” and “manifest destiny.” This is the
level that critical race theorist Richard Delgado calls the “narrative of the ingroup,”
which consists of the stories told by a dominant group to “remind it of its identity in
relation to outgroups, and provide it with a form of shared reality in which its own
superior position is seen as natural.”5 At a second level, that of constitutional
jurisdprudence, the narrative of color-blindness in American law threatens to foreclose
Native Hawaiians’ preferential access to economic resources and self-determination,
despite the Hawaiians’ dispossession during decades of Western control.
The power to narrate operates at both levels in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000
decision in Rice v. Cayetano,6 where the Court invalidated the election of trustees of
Hawaii’s Office of Hawaiian Affairs, holding that by limiting the electorate to persons of
Native Hawaiian descent, the State of Hawaii had violated the 15th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The Rice decision accelerated Constitutional challenges to a number
of Native Hawaiian programs.7 Close analysis of the Court’s decision will reveal how it

5

Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2412 (1989).
6

528 U.S. 495 (2000).

7

The decision also gave renewed life to Congressional efforts to formalize the United States’ recognition
of a “special relationship” with the Native Hawaiians analogous to that between the government and Native
American Indian tribes. The most recent vehicle for this effort is Senate Bill 147, “The Native Hawaiian
Government Reorganization Act of 2005,” also known as “the Akaka Bill” for its principal Senate sponsor,
Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii). The bill, which at this writing is awaiting debate and a vote in the Senate,
would establish a process through which the U.S. government would eventually recognize a Native
Hawaiian governing entity and enter into negotiations with that entity for purposes of transferring lands and
resources and governmental authority over them, and setting up a division of civil and criminal authority in
the Hawaiian Islands. The Akaka Bill has provoked fervent debate both in Congress and in Hawaii.
Proponents see it as long overdue recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty and concrete reparation for the U.S.
government’s role in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. Opponents fall into two camps. One
argues that the future status of the Native Hawaiian Governing Entity will still be too bound up with the
United States Government, and does not go far enough in restoring independence. The opposite camp
decries the Akaka Bill as a dangerous racial balkanization of the Hawaiian Islands that will lead to the
dispossession of all racial and ethnic groups who cannot claim native ancestry. For a summary of the
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puts the Native Hawaiians in a double bind. On the one hand, the opinion relies upon,
and thus institutionalizes, a racialized history of Hawaii that Western colonizers used to
legitimate their takeover. On the other hand, when Native Hawaiians resist, and demand
reparations and self-determination, they are accused of claiming race-based preferences
that are impermissible in “color-blind” America. Rice thus lays bare how law and its
narratives can function as instruments of colonial domination.8
This article begins with a summary of Hawaiian history that will endeavor to
respect Native Hawaiian sources, traditions, and perspectives, and that is positioned, in
the sense that it consciously takes the political position of the indigenous peoples, and
attempts to recover a history that Westerners have tried to erase. Part II will introduce
theoretical perspectives on narrative. Postcolonial theory will establish the basic
connections between narrative and power. Theories of narrative in the law will suggest
that the forms of legal discourse that predominate in the American legal system silence
the native voice and enshrine white privilege and power. Part III will compare the
narrative of Hawaiian history in Part I to the racialized history the Supreme Court
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accepted in Rice. Part IV will describe how the Court’s historical narrative interacts with
the narrative of color-blindness to defeat Native Hawaiians’ claims to reparations and
self-determination. Part V will point to three strategies of resistance to the law as an
instrument of colonial power: reclaiming the native voice, critical analysis of “the law is
colorblind,” and pursuit of Native Hawaiians’ self-determination through the mechanisms
of international law.

I. Hawaii’s History: Domination and Resistance
A. Domination: From Indigenous Society to Statehood
1. When does Hawaii’s “history” begin?
To narrate the history of the Hawaiian Islands is immediately to take sides in a
political debate. The first point of contention is when the Islands’ history begins. Most
Western histories skip the more than 1000 years of known human settlement in the
Hawaiian Islands and begin their narrative with the “discovery” of Hawaii by Captain
James Cook in 1778. Gavin Daws, whose Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian
Islands is the most popular and most-often cited modern treatment, reveals its Western
bias in the first sentence of the Prologue: “The existence of the Hawaiian Islands became
known to Europeans late in the eighteenth century, at the end of the great age of
exploration in the Pacific.”9 To Daws, and to almost all his fellow historians, Hawaiian
history began—as Daws writes in the first sentence of Chapter 1 of Shoal of Time—when
“at dawn on January 18, 1778, a high island, deep blue in the early light, appeared to the
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northeast, and shortly afterward another to the north.”10 The observers of these deep blue
islands were, of course, the crews of Cook’s sailing ships Resolution and Discovery.
If in fact it were possible to identify the first pair of eyes to view these islands
emerging out of the Pacific mists, they would have belonged to an ocean voyager from
the Marquesas Islands or thereabouts, who arrived in Hawaiian waters around 300 or 500
A.D. To accept this moment as the beginning of Hawaiian history, however, as well as
the subsequent millennium of cultural and social development of an indigenous people,
requires an enlargement of the historical record. It requires recognition of the findings of
archaeologists and anthropologists, as well as indigenous oral traditions transmitted in
chants and genealogies such as the Hawaiian story of creation, the Kumalipo.11 Accepting
the relevance and reliability of these sources is as much a political as a historiographical
choice, because only by taking these sources seriously is it possible to construct a
counternarrative to the Western account.
2. Indigenous society
On the basis of the archaeological record and the traditional sources—the latter
collated and transmitted in some cases by nineteenth-century Native Hawaiian writers
such as David Malo12 and Samuel Kamakau,13 who learned English in schools run by

10

Id. at 1.

11

For extensive discussions and bibliographies of the archaeological and anthropological literature, and
consideration of the traditional sources for pre-contact Hawaiian history, see PATRICK V. KIRCH, ON THE
ROAD OF THE WINDS: AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS BEFORE EUROPEAN
CONTACT (2000), and THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDERS (Donald Denoon et al. eds.,
1997).
12

DAVID MALO, HAWAIIAN ANTIQUITIES (MO’OLELO HAWAII) (Nathaniel B. Emerson, trans., Bishop
Museum Press ed. 1951) (1898).

13

SAMUEL M. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAII (Kamehameha Schools Press revised ed. 1992)
(1961).

6

American missionaries—we can construct a picture of the indigenous society and culture
of the Hawaiian Islands prior to European contact. In brief, society was organized in
clans or lineages under the authority of the Ali’i Nui, or “ruling chiefs.” The Hawaiians
regarded the Ali’i as mediators between the gods and ordinary people, responsible for
ensuring the people’s prosperity by enforcing various taboos and carrying out rituals that
demonstrated respect for the gods.14
The organizing principle for the society was Malama ‘Aina—love, or reverence,
for the land. The land itself was divided for purposes of settlement, cultivation, and
governance into districts, or ahupua’a. Private ownership was unknown. Rather, the
Ali’i, whose power and legitimacy derived primarily from their ability to embody
Malama ‘Aina in themselves and to inspire it in their people, oversaw the interdependent
relationships through which the necessities of life were exchanged among the people. As
historian LilikalQ Kame’eleihiwa put it:
The ahupua’a were usually wedge-shaped sections of land that
followed natural geographical boundaries, such as ridge lines and
rivers, and ran from mountain to sea. A valley bounded by ridges
on two or three sides, and by the sea on the fourth, would be a
natural ahupua’a. The word ahupua’a means “pig altar” and was
named for the stone altars with pig head carvings that marked the
boundaries of each ahupua’a. Ideally, an ahupua’a would include
within its borders all the materials required for sustenance—
timber, thatching, and rope from the mountains, various crops from
the uplands, kalo [taro] from the lowlands, and fish from the sea.
All members of the society shared access to these life-giving
necessities.15
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The pre-contact population of the Hawaiian Islands is also a politically contested
historical “fact.” Most Western histories place it between 300,000 and 400,000, a
relatively conservative figure that minimizes the lethality of Western disease and land
acquisition on the native population. Other sources place the pre-contact population
closer to one million.16 When Cook arrived in 1778 he encountered a political structure in
which the Ali’i owed their allegiance to one or another of several moi (kings) who held
ultimate authority on the various islands. The strongest of these kings proved to be
Kamehameha I, who successfully subdued the islands of Maui, Lana’i, Moloka’i and
O’ahu, and by 1810 united the Hawaiian Islands under his rule by gaining the allegiance
of Kaua’i.17
3. Destruction of the native population
Between Cook’s arrival and 1820, the native population shrank to half its precontact size; by 1866 only 57,000 Native Hawaiians were alive.18 Disease, famine, and
war were the chief causes of the decline. An ever-increasing flow of Western
missionaries, merchants, and sailors putting in for supplies during whaling voyages
aggravated the devastation. Their disregard of indigenous land use, worship, and social
organization profoundly disrupted the local culture.
As in so many aspects of Hawaiian history, the massive die-off of the native
population has inspired conflicting interpretations that reflect dominant ideological
16
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commitments. For example, David Malo, the missionary-educated Hawaiian historian,
appears to have internalized the values and perspectives of his teachers when he explains
the effects of disease by referring to the natives’ licentiousness and promiscuity, and the
internecine wars of the Ali’i. “God is angry,” wrote Malo in 1839, “and he is punishing
his people.”19 Thirty years later, Samuel Kamakau took a different view, but Englishlanguage readers would have missed the following passage from Kamakau’s history
because the translator omitted it when rendering the Hawaiian original into English.
Trying to account for the mass death of his people, Kamakau wrote (in Hawaiian):
The reason for this misfortune and the decimation of the Hawaiian
lahui [people, or nation], it is understood, is that the haole [whites]
are people who kill other peoples; and their desire for glory and
riches, those are the companions of the devastating diseases.20
Among the most significant factors speeding the destruction of the population and
the transfer of power into Western hands was the program of land tenure instigated under
intense Western pressure by King Kamehameha in 1842. Their lives and livelihoods in
the ahupua’a having been disrupted by the waves of white settlers, Hawaiians had been
migrating into Honolulu where they had little economic opportunity.21 By this time
whites had gained dominant influence in the King’s Privy Council, largely because they
controlled an increasing share of the economic activity on which the monarchy had come
to depend. They convinced the King that private ownership of land would provide a
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solution to the problem of urban migration.22 Under the land transfer program (known as
the Mahele), land that had hitherto been held in common under the authority of the King
and the Ali’i would be divided into categories: one-third would be retained by the King;
one-third would be distributed to the Ali’i, and the rest would be available for private
purchase.23
The King agreed, on the condition that non-Hawaiians would not be allowed to
own the land. The Privy Council reneged on this agreement in 1850, however, and
economically savvy whites soon bought up almost all of the available land from natives
who had no understanding of western concepts of property rights. Forty years later the
1890 census revealed that the Mahele, which had been pressed on the King as a way to
benefit the native population, had created a society in which almost all the landowners
were the whites, who owned 75% of the land that was in private hands.24
Even the massively destructive effects of the Mahele on native health and wealth
were subject to interpretations that palliated whatever sting they may have inflicted on a
white conscience. Looking out at the rapidly changing economy and power structure in
the Islands in 1851, a missionary-turned-businessman wrote:
It seems as if Providence is fighting against this nation internally.
…Diseases are fast numbering the people with the dead, and many
22
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more are slow to take advantage of the times and privileges
granted to them by the King and Government. …While the natives
stand confounded and amazed at their privileges and doubting the
truth of the changes on their behalf, the foreigners are creeping in
among them, getting their largest and best lands, water privileges,
building lots, etc. etc.
The Lord seems to be allowing such things to take place that the
Islands may gradually pass into other hands. This is trying but we
cannot help it. It is what we have been contending against for
years, but the Lord is showing us that His thoughts are not our
thoughts, neither are his ways our ways. The will of the Lord be
done.25
For many whites, then, their domination of the native was a sign of God’s
providence.
4. The consolidation of white control
In the half-century following the Mahele, Western merchants and landowners
consolidated their control of Hawaii’s land and people primarily through their
development of the sugar industry. Vast sections of Hawaii were transformed into
plantations. By 1900, when the Native Hawaiian population had dwindled to
approximately 40,000, plantation owners had imported some 400,000 Chinese, Japanese,
Portuguese, and Filipino laborers to support their operations.26 The economics of sugar
required favorable trading terms with the United States. To secure them, the landowners
and merchants began agitating for closer ties between the then independent Kingdom of
Hawaii and the United States, with an increasingly influential faction advocating outright
annexation. In 1887 these forces pressed Hawaii’s King David Kalakaua to accept a new
constitution (the “Bayonet Constitution”) that reduced the power of the King, and for the
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first time in Hawaii’s history extended the right to vote to non-Hawaiian males.27 Soon
the whites dominated the Legislature, and a concerted push for annexation by the United
States was under way, reaching its climax in 1893 during the reign of Queen
Lili’uokalani.28
The ensuing events are summarized in the 2005 Senate Report to accompany the
Akaka Bill:
On January 14, 1893, the Queen was prepared to
promulgate a new constitution, restoring the sovereign’s control
over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian
subjects. She was, however, forced to withdraw her proposed
constitution.
Despite the Queen’s apparent acquiescence, the majority of
westerners recognized that the Hawaiian monarchy posed a
continuing threat to the unimpeded pursuit of their interests. They
formed a Committee of Public Safety to overthrow the Kingdom.
…A Honolulu publisher and member of the Committee, Lorrin
Thurston, informed the United States of a plan to dethrone the
Queen. In response, the Secretary of the Navy informed Thurston
that President Harrison authorized him to say that “if conditions in
Hawaii compel you to act as you have indicated, and you come to
Washington with an annexation proposition you will find an
exceedingly sympathetic administration here.” The American
annexation group collaborated closely with the United States
Minister in Hawaii, John Stevens.
On January 16, 1893, at the order of Minister Stevens,
American soldiers marched through Honolulu, to a building …
located near both the government building and the palace. The
next day, local revolutionaries seized the government building and
demanded that Queen Lili’uokalani abdicate.29
The Queen issued a statement:
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I Lili’uokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of
the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against
any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional
Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming
to have established Provisional Government of and for this
kingdom.
That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America
whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens,
has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and
declared that he would support the Provisional Government.
Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss
of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my
authority until such time as the Government of the United States
shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its
representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as
the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.30
The Queen was never reinstated. On February 1, 1893, the U.S. Minister raised
the American flag and proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate of the United States.31 President
Grover Cleveland refused to recognize the actions of the Provisional Government, and
even declared that the overthrow would never have happened but for the intervention of
American troops.32 However, William McKinley succeeded Cleveland in office in 1896,
and McKinley was an eager annexationist. Events now moved swiftly. By August, 1898,
the “Republic of Hawaii” had ceded sovereignty and conveyed title to its public lands to
the United States, and by 1900 Congress had established a Territorial Government.
Statehood arrived in 1959.33
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B. Resistance: From the Sovereignty Movement to Rice v. Cayetano
1. Hawaii under the Americans
The remnant Native Hawaiian population fared very poorly under the United
States. Yamamoto, Shirota, and Kim summarize the post annexation history of Hawaii
this way:
Americans in control banned the Hawaiian language and closed
Hawaiian schools. As with many Native American tribes, Western
diseases and the separation of Hawaiians from their homelands
hastened an economic, cultural, and spiritual decline. So
devastating was this decline that in 1920 Congress deemed Native
Hawaiians a “dying race” and set aside 200,000 acres of
“homelands” to resurrect Hawaiian life and culture. But this
program was so poorly (and sometimes corruptly) administered by
the federal and later state governments that non-Hawaiians ended
up occupying most of the lands, while 20,000 Hawaiians jammed
the homelands’ waiting list.34
The Hawaiian Advisory Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, using
1999 data from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, concluded, “the socioeconomic statistics
depicting Native Hawaiians are startling. … [I]n comparison to other residents of Hawaii,
Native Hawaiians have disproportionately low levels of employment, homeownership,
income security, and education. Conversely, they have disproportionately high levels of
substance and physical abuse, medical problems, impaired mental health, and
homelessness.”35
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2. Native resistance movements and their effects
Beginning in the 1960s Native Hawaiians began to organize protests of their
social and economic conditions. Most of the early resistance focused on land.36 Civil
disobedience, forced evictions, and other means of protest called public attention to the
impact of tourist development and other land use decisions on Native Hawaiians’ wellbeing. Native Hawaiian political organizations pressed for solutions ranging from
secession and independence to some form of nation-within-a nation status analogous to
that of Native American Indian tribes. The largest of these groups, Ka LQhui Hawaii,
promulgated a Master Plan for Hawaiian Self-Government in 1995, and sent
representatives to United Nations-sponsored proceedings on the rights of indigenous
peoples.37
The first official response to this era of protest took the form of an amendment to
the state constitution, establishing an Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) to coordinate
programs that would benefit Native Hawaiians. The OHA, with a nine-member board of
trustees who could be selected only by voters legally defined as “Hawaiians,”
administered 20 percent of the earnings from the public lands ceded to the State of
Hawaii in 1959. In addition, Congress passed a number of laws providing special
benefits to Native Hawaiians, many acknowledging a “unique political relationship
between the United States and Native Hawaiians.”38 Finally, in 1993, Congress passed a
Joint Resolution “to acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January, 17, 1893
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overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians for
[that] overthrow.”39
3. Resistance stalls
From the vantage point of 2006, the Apology Resolution appears to be the high
water mark of the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement. White resistance to Native
Hawaiian preferences for benefit programs culminated in 1996 when Harold Rice, a
white resident of Hawaii, filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii,
alleging that his right to vote for OHA trustees had been denied in violation of the 14th
and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights
Act, and provisions of the Hawaii State Constitution.40 In an opinion issued on February
23, 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed that the statute permitting only
Hawaiians to vote for trustees of OHA (legally a state agency) created a race-based
classification in violation of the 15th Amendment.41
Rice emboldened opponents of Native Hawaiian preferences to press the attack
against many programs, even as the beneficiaries tried to convince the judiciary that their
claims were not race-based but, rather, a recognition of the “special political relationship”
between the United States and the Hawaiian people as spelled out in the Apology
Resolution. The Rice Court refused to accept this argument. Though the Court
acknowledged that in its 1974 opinion in Morton v. Mancari42 it had exempted voting
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preferences for Native Americans from Constitutional challenge, the Rice majority
argued,
If Hawaii's restriction were to be sustained under Mancari we
would be required to accept some beginning premises not yet
established in our case law. Among other postulates, it would be
necessary to conclude that Congress has determined that native
Hawaiians have a status like that of Indians in organized tribes, and
that it may, and has, delegated to the State a broad authority to
preserve that status. These propositions would raise questions of
considerable moment and difficulty. It is a matter of some dispute,
for instance, whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it
does the Indian tribes. We can stay far off that difficult terrain,
however.43
The Court then concluded that even if Congress had the authority to treat Native
Hawaiians as tribes, “the State's argument fails for a more basic reason. … Congress may
not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort.”44
The Supreme Court declined to analogize the Native Hawaiians to the Indian
Tribes for purposes of evaluating the Hawaiians-only voting requirement in the OHA
elections. Lower courts that have continued to follow the reasoning that the Supreme
Court articulated in Rice. In a decision from 2005, a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited Rice in support of its decision to strike down the
admission policies of the private Kamehameha School in Honolulu, which favored
applicants with pure or part aboriginal blood.45

43

528 U.S. at 518.

44

Id.

45

Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d. 1025, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005). The
Kamahameha Schools and Bishop Estate have recently filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit for a
rehearing en banc. One of the amicus briefs filed to support their petition sheds at least some light on the
current state of race relations in multi-ethnic Hawaii at this time of Native Hawaiian assertiveness and
white Hawaii’s counterattack. Honolulu attorneys Eric Yamamoto and Susan Serrano filed the brief on
behalf of the Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii-Honolulu Chapter, Centro Legal de la Raza,
and the Equal Justice Society, “a national organization of scholars, advocates, and individuals advancing

17

If the tide has indeed turned against the Native Hawaiians, it is in part because of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s views of “race.” It is also because the Court has accepted a
particular version of Hawaiian history, privileging a narrative that, at least since the early
nineteenth century, has served to legitimate western colonial domination. To
demonstrate these propositions, it will be necessary to examine the Rice decision from
two perspectives: post-colonial theories of narrative, and the role of narrative in the law.

II. Theoretical Perspectives
A. Narrative in Post-Colonial Theory
Edward Said observed the intimate connection between power and control over
others and the power to control stories about others. “The power to narrate,” Said wrote,
“or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and
imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them.”46 Albert
Memmi’s analysis of the psychological and power relations between colonizers and the
colonized deepens Said’s insight.47
1. Albert Memmi: The colonizer
Memmi, a Tunisian Jew, was born in 1920. His writings reflect his experience of
French colonial rule. Originally written in 1957, The Colonizer and the Colonized is in
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part a phenomenological account of the consciousness that accompanies colonial
domination. Memmi characterizes the colonizer as essentially a usurper.
A foreigner, having come to a land by the accidents of history, he
has succeeded not merely in creating a place for himself but also in
taking away that of the inhabitant, granting himself astounding
privileges to the detriment of those rightfully entitled to them. And
this is not by virtue of local laws, which in a certain way legitimize
this inequality by tradition, but by upsetting the established rules
and substituting his own. He thus appears doubly unjust. He is a
privileged being and an illegitimately privileged one; that is a
usurper.48
In this setting, narrative is an essential tool of colonization because through it the
colonizer so frames his situation and the situation of the colonized as to transform
privilege into entitlement. This requires two basic moves. One is to portray the
colonized as so backward and primitive that they deserve their subordinate position. The
other is to repress or disguise the colonizer’s brutality. Narrative is central to both. Of
the first move Memmi writes,
[A]ccepting the reality of being a colonizer means agreeing to be a
nonlegitimate privileged person, that is, a usurper. To be sure, a
usurper claims his place and, if need be, will defend it by every
means at his disposal. This amounts to saying that at the very time
of his triumph, he admits that what triumphs in him is an image
which he condemns. …In other words, to possess victory
completely he needs to absolve himself of it and the conditions
under which it was attained. This explains his strenuous
insistence, strange for a victor, on apparently futile matters. He
endeavors to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would extinguish
memories—anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation
into legitimacy. …His disquiet and resulting thirst for justification
require the usurper to extol himself to the skies and to drive the
usurped below ground at the same time. In effect, these two
attempts are inseparable.49
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In a passage that recalls the contrasting visions of contemporary Hawaii with
which this paper began, Memmi points out that it would actually be psychologically
untenable for the colonizer to acknowledge the destruction and devastation that he has
worked on the land he has taken over, and so,
No matter what happens he justifies everything—the system and
the officials in it. He obstinately pretends to have seen nothing of
the poverty and injustice which are right under his nose; he is
interested only in creating a position for himself, in obtaining his
share. …Why should [the immigrants] not congratulate themselves
for having come to the colony? Should they not be convinced of
the excellence of the system which makes them what they are?
Henceforth they will defend it aggressively; they will end up
believing it to be right. In other words, the immigrant has been
transformed into a colonialist.50
Reciprocally, the colonizer must portray the colonized as having deserved their fate. A
typical argument—one that requires a supporting narrative of pre-colonial history—runs:
“Before colonization, weren’t the colonized already backward? If they let themselves be
colonized, it is precisely because they did not have the capacity to fight, either militarily
or technically.”51
To Memmi, the arguments that the colonizer marshals in order to legitimize his
usurpation are ineluctably racist. “Colonial racism,” Memmi argues, “is built from three
ideological components: one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the
colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist;
three, the use of these supposed differences as standards of absolute fact.”52 By
essentializing the subordinate position of the colonized—by embedding subordination
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and degradation into the colonized’s very nature—the colonialist both reassures himself
of the appropriateness of his position and inoculates his domination against historical
challenge.
Racism appears, then, not as an incidental detail, but as a
consubstantial part of colonialism. It is the highest expression of
the colonial system, and one of the most significant features of the
colonialist. Not only does it establish a fundamental
discrimination between colonizer and colonized, a sine qua non of
colonial life, but it also lays the foundation for the immutability of
this life. …The servitude of the colonized seemed scandalous to
the colonizer and forced him to explain it away under the pain of
ending the scandal and threatening his own existence. Thanks to a
double reconstruction of the colonized and himself, he is able both
to justify and reassure himself. …[S]ince servitude is part of the
nature of the colonized, and domination part of his own, there will
be no dénouement. To the delight of rewarded virtue he adds the
necessity of natural laws. Colonization is eternal, and he can look
to his future without worries of any kind.53
2. Ngugi wa Thiong’o: The cultural bomb
The Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o delves as deeply as Memmi into the
consciousness and motivations of the colonialist, but his sensitivities as a novelist and
playwright draw the power of narrative into high relief. Ngugi began his career, as did
most African intellectuals of the twentieth century, writing in the language of the colonial
power—in Ngugi’s case, English. From 1977, however, in recognition of the paradoxical
dilemma of the post-colonial critic of colonialism who must express his resistance in the
language of his oppressor, Ngugi abandoned English in his artistic work for his tribal
languages of GXkYyY and Kiswahili.54 He continues to write criticism and political
commentary in English. This background supplies an autobiographical flavor to Ngugi’s
53
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assertion that of all the weapons imperialism and colonialism have in their arsenal, the
biggest is “the cultural bomb.”
The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in
their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their
heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities, and
ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one
wasteland of non-achievement and makes them want to distance
themselves from that wasteland. It makes them want to identify
with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance,
with other people’s languages rather than their own. It makes them
identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those
forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants
serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities
of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The
intended results are despair, despondency, and a collective deathwish. Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism
presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependant sing
hymns of praise with the constant refrain: “Theft is holy.”55
Ngugi’s comments resonate sharply with the banning of the Hawaiian language
that was an integral part of the United States’ post-annexation governance of the
Islands.56 By forcing Hawaiians to communicate in the language of their oppressors,
Ngugi’s perspective suggests, the American authorities struck not only at a means of
communication but also at a carrier of culture.57 “Language carries culture,” Ngugi
explains, “and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body
of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world. How
people perceive themselves affects how they look at their culture, at their politics and at
the social production of wealth, at their entire relationship to nature and to other beings.
Language is thus inseparable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a
55
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specific form and character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world.”58
Thus, to Ngugi, “The domination of a people’s language by the languages of the
colonising nations was crucial to the domination of the mental universe of the
colonized.”59
Through language and narrative, the “cultural bomb” wreaks its destruction in two
ways. As suggested in the preceding paragraphs, losing the ability to express oneself
publicly in one’s native language leads to profound self-alienation and disempowerment.
Ngugi calls this “colonial alienation.”
It starts with a deliberate disassociation of the language of
conceptualisation, of thinking, of formal education, of mental
development, from the language of daily interaction in the home
and in the community. It is like separating the mind from the body
so that they are occupying two unrelated linguistic spheres in the
same person. On a larger social scale it is like producing a society
of bodiless heads and headless bodies.60
We might call this effect of the cultural bomb an internal effect; it works from
within the colonized person, to confuse, distort, and ultimately to paralyze the
colonized’s mental processes, undermining the colonized’s will to self-assertion. The
cultural bomb also works externally, however, through the racist images of the colonized
that are propagated through popular narratives in the colonizer’s language. Ngugi
illustrates this with “the three Africas” that emerged in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Western European fiction and travel writing. Each of these “Africas” fixed an image of
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backwardness, primitiveness, and exploitability that, in Memmi’s terms, supplied
legitimation and reassurance to the imperialist enterprise.
The first “Africa” is that of the hunter after profit, exemplified for Ngugi in
Balzac’s Eugénie Grandet. To the hunter for profit, “it does not matter what, in terms of
human beings, the cost is of the profit that enables him to live in palaces and to marry
well. …When he looks at Africa it is not to see the human faces of the masses whose
poverty and degradation and oppression are the real conditions for his rising rate of
profit. No, what he is looking for are conditions of stability, and it does not matter if that
stability is founded on the blood and flesh of millions. It does not matter, if you like, if
that stability is founded on the fact that the tongues of millions have been mutilated to
make them unable to shout their discontent.”61
The second “Africa” is that of the hunter for pleasure—the tourist’s Africa
portrayed in the travelogues and glossy airline magazines. This Africa is populated
mainly by animals in lush landscapes. Between the covers of books with titles such as
Vanishing Africa or The Authentic African, the tourist finds that
in the pictures that illustrate the books such Africans are nearly
always naked and they are often photographed with animals to
show [their] harmony with the animal landscape. The hunter for
pleasure is really the hunter for profit but on holiday. He does not
want to see or face up to the reality that is the African worker who
creates his profit. Hence the literary deathwish for the African
engaged in the active struggle against nature and against human
degradation.62
The third “Africa” is the creation of European fiction writers. To illustrate the
mix of infantilization and dehumanization of Africans with which European novelists
61
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paved the colonialist’s self-justifying path into the continent, Ngugi turns to Karen Blixen
(Isak Dinesen), author of Out of Africa. Ngugi’s first example conveys a racism that is
“catching because it is persuasively put forward as love. But it is the love of a man for a
horse or for a pet.”63 Ngugi quotes Blixen thus:
When you have caught the rhythm of Africa, you find that it is the
same in all her music. What I learned from the game of the
country was useful to me in my dealings with the native people.64
Later in Blixen’s career, in her book Shadows in the Grass, she repeated her racist views
even more emphatically:
The dark nations of Africa, strikingly precocious as young
children, seemed to come to a standstill in their mental growth at
different ages. The Kikuyu, Kawirondo and Wakambo, the people
who worked for me on the farm, in early childhood were far ahead
of white children of the same age, but they stopped quite suddenly
at a stage corresponding to that of a European child of nine. The
Somali had got further and had all the mentality of boys of our
own race at the age of 13 to 17.65
B. Narrative in the Law
When law functions as an instrument of colonialism, the role of narrative is one
thread in a broader tapestry. P.G. McHugh describes the larger context as “the practice of
lawfare against the tribes.”66 It has, in his view, four principal dimensions: law’s
transformation of space into marketable real estate; the establishment of economic
entitlements; the definition of aboriginal being; and the ritualization of encounters
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between aboriginals and the West, so that even in resistance the aboriginals confronted
the colonialists on the latter’s terms.67
Writing with particular emphasis on the impact of Western legal thought on the
American Indian, Robert Williams, Jr., documents how Western colonizers deployed the
“doctrine of discovery”—lands “discovered” by a colonial power became the property of
the sovereign of that power—to justify the dispossession of the native inhabitants.68
Williams echoes McHugh’s characterization of “lawfare” when he writes,
Power, in its most brutal mass-mobilized form as will to empire,
was of course far more determinate in the establishment of
Western hegemony in the New World than were any laws or
theoretical formulations on the legal rights and status of American
Indians. But the exercise of power as efficient colonizing force
requires effective tools and instruments…[and]…law and legal
discourse were the perfect instruments of empire for Spain,
England, and the United States in their colonizing histories,
performing legitimating, energizing, and constraining roles in the
West’s assumption of power over the Indian’s America.69
1. Paul Gewirtz: Law and storytelling
To appreciate how colonialist narratives perform their work of legitimation,
reassurance (of the colonizer), and repression (of the colonized) within the framework of
the legal system, we may refer first to work on law, narrative, and rhetoric by Paul
Gewirtz, Peter Brooks, and their colleagues at a symposium at Yale in 1995.70 They
begin by describing trials as “the telling of stories.” This immediately suggests normative
questions to Gewirtz, for example: “Are the right people getting their stories told, to a
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sufficient degree and with adequate effectiveness? Do the multiplicities of narratives at
trial (and on appeal) undercut the idea of objectivity or the idea that there is such a thing
as the truth? Or does this narrative multiplicity suggest only that people are at times
fallible or deceptive or at times so indifferent to truth that they may let people literally get
away with murder?”71
Delgado and Stefancic have described how standard courtroom procedures and
rules of evidence make it almost impossible to tell one’s story in one’s own words, with
the nuances, emotions, perspectives, and associations that make a story personal.72
“Courts,” they write, “carve up your stories into little unfamiliar pieces, and then quiz
you to see if you really believe in each of them. They kill your narrative and transform it
into something you do not recognize. They force you to choose and defend a past that is
unfamiliar to you—one that is not yours.”73 As McHugh points out, these “clinical
procedures of the adversary system” are especially lethal to aboriginal land claims,
because those claims typically rest on oral traditions that wither under the assault of the
Western legal system’s bias in favor of written documentation.74 As one commentator on
a 1979 case wrote of the Mashpee Indians’ failed attempt to obtain recognition as a tribe
for purposes of legitimating claims to land in Massachusetts, “In the courtroom how
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could one give value to an undocumented ‘tribal’ life largely invisible (or unheard) in the
surviving record?”75
If trials are contests between stories, then judicial opinions at the appellate level
not only express the majority’s preference for the “winning” narrative, but, in their efforts
to persuade, and rebut the preferences of the dissenters, the majority opinion is itself a
narrative—plotted, structured, and equipped with rhetorical maneuvers and tropes. This
emerges with striking force when an appeals court overturns the court below, as did the
U.S. Supreme Court in Rice v. Cayetano. In the terms of Brooks’s and Gewirtz’s
perspective on narrative and the law, the reversal amounts to an appellate court’s
retelling the story with a different outcome, using different
narrative glue to bind events together. And when the majority
opinion is countered by dissent, two retellings are in competition,
the one uneasily, though conclusively, victorious because it
convinces at least one more of these professional listeners than did
the other. The law fascinates the literary critic in part because
people go to jail, even to execution, because of the wellformedness and force of the winning story. Conviction in the legal
sense results from the conviction created in those who judge the
story.76
2. Thomas Ross: Stories that subjugate
Just as in the case of post-colonial narratives in the culture at large, such as those
identified by Ngugi, legal narratives work both by what they include and in what they
suppress. Thomas Ross calls attention to the judicial opinions of nineteenth-century
America that upheld American apartheid largely through their incorporation of
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degrading, dehumanizing language about American blacks.77 Ross argues that these
opinions served the same colonialist motivations of reassurance and legitimation of
oppression that Memmi describes. Writing of the subjugation of blacks in nineteenthcentury America, Ross observes,
The basic tool for subjugation was law and the law’s necessary
coherence came from narratives and assumptions that were in an
inescapable sense chosen and not merely received. They were
chosen because they worked for the dominant race, even though
they propped up a social structure that humiliated and subjugated
innocent human beings. Thus, narratives, like the law they built,
were a reflection of the dominant moral values of nineteenthcentury America.78
3. Robert Ferguson: Law’s untold stories
By incorporating stories that justified subjugation, judicial opinions such as those
in Dred Scott79 and Plessy v. Ferguson80 institutionalized the racism of the day. But it is
equally important to recognize how the legal stories that are not told serve—by their very
absence from the record—to perpetuate structures of racial or economic domination. In
his analysis of “untold stories in the law,” Robert Ferguson asks, “In the proliferation and
refinement of courtroom stories, what does it mean when an available and viable account
is not raised in courtroom debate? What, in effect, happens when a relevant story is
actively repressed in a republic of laws?”81
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Using as his illustrative example the near total obliteration from the public record
of slaves’ defenses to the charge of insurrection in early nineteenth-century Virginia,
Ferguson argues that these defenses have not simply been “lost”—they have been
actively supressed. The dilemma for the white power structure, Ferguson asserts, lay in
the contradiction of punishing (sometimes by execution) rebellious slaves who justified
their actions in the same terms of freedom and equality that the white slaveholders had
relied upon in their revolt against England. Rather than confront the contradiction, the
slaveholders wiped the record clean of the slaves’ defenses. Thus, writes Ferguson, “The
surface narrative of a courtroom transcript is not unlike the consciousness of an
individual; both offer the official record of what passes for explanation, and both know
themselves to be under distinct pressure from other levels of explanation that need to be
contained.”82 Thus do the institutions of the law contribute to a “structural amnesia” on
the part of the dominant society, creating what in anthropologist Mary Douglas’s words
are “shadowed places in which nothing can be seen and no questions asked.”83
The problem for the Virginia planters was reconciling slavery with their ideology
of equality. Transposing the dynamic of structural amnesia and untold stories to the
contemporary situation of the Native Hawaiians, we will see that the problem for the
white power structure, and for the Rice majority, was reconciling their denial of
Hawaiians’ self-determination with the very explicit language of Congress’s Apology
Resolution. In both contexts, Ferguson might suggest, the contradiction stimulates the
oppressor to deploy rhetorical and narrative strategies that conceal the contradiction’s
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attendant psychological discomfort. In the case of the Hawaiians, one additional legal
narrative was available for the purpose, a narrative that could sustain a regime of racial
oppression without labeling it as such. This is the narrative of America’s constitutional
color-blindness.
4. Neil Gotanda: Racial subordination under a color-blind constitution
Justice Harlan’s declaration in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson that “our
constitution is color-blind”84 is the starting point for Neil Gotanda’s extended analysis of
the impact of Harlan’s formulation on the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent racial
jurisprudence.85 Gotanda finds that the Court’s use of Harlan’s legacy in a set of cases
from the 1980s 86 actually “maintains the social, economic, and political advantages that
whites hold over other Americans.”87 Four different meanings of “race” in the language
of the Court are central to Gotanda’s analysis. He argues that in the Court’s usage, “race”
can connote (a) status-race, (b) formal-race, (c) historical-race, or (d) culture-race.88 For
present purposes, the significant distinction is between formal-race and historical-race.
When the Court uses “race” to connote formal-race, Gotanda finds that black and
white are “neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely ‘skin color’ or country of
ancestral origin. [The terms are]…unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral
culpability,… [and]… unconnected to social attributes such as culture, education, wealth,
84
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or language.”89 By contrast, “historical-race embodies past and continuing racial
subordination, and is the meaning of race that the Court contemplates when it applies
‘strict scrutiny’ to racially disadvantaging government conduct.”90 Importantly for
Gotanda, formal-race is so thoroughly disconnected from social realities—that is, from
the historically and socially conditioned experience of racial oppression in the lives of
people of color—that when it dominates the Court’s color-blind constitutional analysis
the Court “often fails to recognize the connections between the race of an individual and
the real social conditions underlying a litigation or other constitutional dispute.”91 The
resulting judicial prescription for racial problems in America is for the government “to
adopt a position of ‘never’ considering race.”92
To Gotanda, color-blind constitutionalism in the formal-race mode produces
results that are as suspicious psychologically as they are legally perverse. For the
government (or an employer) to assert that it notices the race of an individual but does
not consider it—as demanded by the principle of non-recognition—flies in the face of the
lived experience of individuals. It is a pretense, and Gotanda sees in it the urge toward
suppression of an uncomfortable reality that we have previously encountered in the
analyses of Memmi and Ferguson. “Nonrecognition,” Gotanda writes, “fosters the
systematic denial of racial subordination and the psychological repression of an
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individual’s recognition of that subordination, thereby allowing that subordination to
continue.”93
Analysis in the formal-race mode enables courts to tell a particular kind of story
about racial prejudice in American society. The story is that racial prejudice is a matter
of individual attitudes, unrelated to larger social structures or relations. Viewing racism
as a trait of individuals, divorced from any societal or institutional dimensions, absolves
courts from the responsibility to connect a racial minority’s subordination to structural
factors such as substandard housing, education, employment, or income. With
institutional racism erased, the color-blind constitutionalist is free to interpret evidence of
a group’s disadvantage as isolated phenomena outside of history, or else as the workings
of “market forces.”94 In short, Gotanda concludes,
color-blind constitutionalists live in an ideological world where
racial subordination is ubiquitous yet disregarded—unless it takes
the form of individual, intended, and irrational prejudice. Perhaps
formal-race analysis would be a useful tool for fighting racism, if it
recognized that racism is complex and systematic. However, as
presently used, formal-race unconnectedness helps maintain white
privilege by limiting discussion or consideration of racial
subordination.95
Gotanda’s principle of non-recognition, and his concept of formal-race, are two
keys to the effectiveness of the narrative of color-blindness in enabling the Rice Court to
maintain Native Hawaiians in a condition of subordination and disempowerment, not
only in the face of the nation’s history of colonial oppression, but contrary to the manifest
intent of the Apology Resolution. The third and last key, from Gotanda’s perspective, is
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the interaction of non-recognition and formal-race with the doctrine of strict scrutiny. As
illustrated in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson,96 formal-race enables the Court to apply
the strict scrutiny standard to racial preferences designed to mitigate the social and
historical effects of racial discrimination, as effectively as historical-race had supported
the Court’s holding against racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education.97
Gotanda finds in the Court’s reasoning in Croson traces of the formal-race analysis in
Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent in a 1974 affirmative action case, DeFunis v.
Odegaard.98 DeFunis had charged that the University of Washington Law School had
accepted less qualified minority applicants and denied admission to him. In dissent,
Douglas rejected the consideration of race in the admissions process, arguing,
A DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage because of that
fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter what his race or
color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right to have his
application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral
manner.99
We will encounter the identical reasoning in Rice v. Cayetano’s approach to
voting rights. There, as here, Gotanda’s analysis will suggest the legal perversity of
applying, to a policy designed to mitigate the effects of centuries of governmentally
sanctioned and racially-inspired dispossession and oppression, the same constitutional
analysis that evolved to target government-sanctioned racial oppression itself.

96

488 U.S. 469 (1989).

97

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

98

416 U.S. 312 (1974).

99

Id. at 337.

34

This discussion completes the historical and theoretical foundations for assessing
the Supreme Court’s Rice decision. Now let us consider the details of the racialized
history that legitimated the colonial take-over of Hawaii, and how the Court, by
privileging that history in its opinion and adopting a formal-race mode of constitutional
analysis, has perpetuated Native Hawaiians’ colonialist subordination by the United
States. It will remain for the last section of the paper to outline three avenues for Native
Hawaiian resistance to U.S. law as an instrument of colonial power.

III. Racialized History and the Colonial Take-Over of Hawaii
Western accounts of Hawaii amply illustrate Memmi’s insight that colonialist
history legitimates conquest by simultaneously devaluing the colonized and ennobling the
colonizer. A review by Jocelyn Linnekin for the Cambridge History of the Pacific
Islanders shows how colonialist historians portray Europeans as actors, the Islanders as
acted upon—natives are “less rational, less industrious, less capable, and less stable” than
the Westerners.100 “Colonial historiography,” Linnekin notes, “tends to convey certain
key messages about early encounters: that Islanders were naïve and readily responded to
crude materialist appeals, that foreign introductions were the primary agents of change,
and that first encounters with Europeans were the most important events in Island
history.”101 We can observe these themes in the Western narrative of Hawaii—and the
colonialist agendas underlying them—in five areas: (a) descriptions of the nature of
indigenous society; (b) accounts of land reform; (c) characterization of the overthrow in
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1893; (d) Hawaiians’ “consent” to annexation; and (e) the termination of Hawaii’s status
as a non-self-governing entity as defined by the United Nations.
A. Describing Indigenous Society: From Primitive Savagery to the Happy Hula
Land
Captain James Cook’s journal entry for January 19, 1778, recording his first faceto-face meeting with Hawaiian Islanders, sets the tone of colonialist condescension:
The next morning we stood in for the land and were met with
several Canoes filled with people, some of them took courage and
ventured on board. I never saw Indians so much astonished at the
[sic] entering a ship before, their eyes were continually flying from
object to object, the wildness of their looks and actions fully
express’d their surprise and astonishment at the several new
o[b]jects before them and evinced that they had never been on
board ship before However the first man that came on board did
not with all his surprise, forget his own interest, the first moveable
thing that came his way was the lead and line, which he without
asking questions took to put in his Canoe. …At 9 o’clock being
pretty near the shore, I sent three armed boats…to look for a
landing place and fresh water. …As the boats put off an Indian
stole the Butcher[’s] cleaver, leaped over the board with it, got into
his canoe and made for shore, the boats pursued him but to no
effect.102
American missionaries carried on in the same vein, emphasizing in their letters
back home the laziness, lewdness, and childishness of the natives they had come to save.
Daws quotes from these letters to portray the missionaries’ moralistic disdain for native
women, for example, who showed little energy for productive labor, yet “when it came to
frivolous diversion such as a hula they would practice energetically in the hot sun for
days on end.”103 Far worse than “lewd dancing” and public nakedness in the
missionaries’ eyes, however, were reports of polygamy, royal incest, abortion, and
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infanticide.104 One of the leaders of an early missionary band, the Reverend Hiram
Bingham, described his first sight of the natives on March 30, 1820:
The appearance of destitution, degradation, and barbarism, among
the chattering, and almost naked savages, whose heads and feet,
and much of their sunburnt and swarthy skins, were bare, was
appalling. Some of our number, with gushing tears, turned away
from the spectacle. Others, with firmer nerve, continued their
gaze, but were ready to exclaim, “Can these be human beings!
…Can we throw ourselves upon these rude shores, and take up our
abode, for life, among such a people, for the purpose of training
them for heaven?”105
The answer, of course, was yes. Throw themselves on those shores they did,
fortified for the ordeal by the conviction that they were doing God’s will and fulfilling
the white man’s destiny at the same time. Even sixty years later, when white settlers had
subdued vast tracts of Hawaiian land for sugar plantations, and with the indigenous
population declining precipitously from poverty, social dislocation, and disease, one
planter explained to the readers of the local monthly newspaper,
The word in the beginning seems to have been spoken to the white
man, when he was commanded “to subdue the earth and have
dominion over it.” …He has stepped across the Pacific Ocean,
leaving the imprint of his enterprising foot upon the various islands
of the sea; he has taken possession of Australia and India, with
their countless thousands; he has gone to Africa. …The coming of
the white man to Africa means government, enterprise, agriculture,
commerce, churches, schools, law and order. It will be better for
the colored man to have the white man rule. It is better for the
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colored man of India and Australia that the white man rules, and it
is better here that the white man should rule.106
An intermixture of cultural devaluation with colonialist designs on the Islands’
wealth emerges with breathtaking clarity in the correspondence of the United States
Minister to Hawaii in the months leading up to the overthrow of the Queen. In a letter
dated November 19, 1892, Minister Stevens excoriated the Hawaiian monarchy as “an
absurd anachronism.”107 With its feudal basis eroded by the new economics of the sugar
industry, “the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government—an obstruction
to the prosperity and progress of the islands.”108 A few months later, on February 1, 1893,
the Queen was out of power, the American-led provisional government was consolidating
its control, and Stevens exulted in a letter to the State Department, “The Hawaiian pear is
now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it.”109
The pear was plucked formally at statehood in 1959. Since then, a demeaning
cultural narrative has remained in place. As with Ngugi’s “three Africas,”110 the
colonialist cultural narrative for Hawaii undermines the legitimacy of serious indigenous
resistance to western dominance. A primary weapon of subordination in the
contemporary narrative echoes the missionaries’ preoccupation with exoticized,
eroticized Hawaiian women, now epitomized in the tourist industry’s construction of the
hula girl. “Hawaiian women,” notes Trask, “are marketed on posters from Paris to Tokyo
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promising an unfettered ‘primitive’ sexuality. Burdened with commodification of our
culture and exploitation of our people, Hawaiians exist in an occupied country whose
hostage people are forced to witness (and for many, participate in) our own collective
humiliation as tourist artifacts for the First World.”111
Another local critic connects the humiliating and primitivizing effects of
tourism—which she calls the marketing of “kitsch”—directly to the colonialist goal of
perpetuating subordination. “By making Hawaiian-ness seem ridiculous [from aloha
shirts to tiki bars to pineapple and ham pizza], kitsch functions to undermine sovereignty
in a very fundamental way. A culture without dignity cannot be conceived of as having
sovereign rights, and the repeated marketing of kitsch Hawaiian-ness leads to nonHawaiians’ misunderstanding and degradation of Hawaiian culture and history.
Bombarded by kitsch along with images of leisure and paradise, non-Hawaiians fail to
take Hawaiian sovereignty seriously and Hawaiian activism remains invisible to the
mainstream.”112
Hall concludes with an observation that summons Memmi’s notion that through
narrative the colonizer disguises and suppresses the evidence of his brutal rise to power.
The frivolity and omnipresence of kitsch images of Hawaii cover
over a history of massive death, colonial dispossession, and
attempted cultural destruction. And yet another factor that enables
the kitschy transformations of Hawaiians and Hawaiian culture is
that unlike other stigmatized groups in the United States,
Hawaiians are not feared. …Instead, our friendliness has been a
major selling point for the tourist industry for more than a century,
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possibly because the death toll from colonization was so onesided.113
B. Land Reform
As noted above, the principal motivation for Westerners to agitate for private
ownership of land was economic. The benefits of capitalist, industrial exploitation of the
Islands—particularly through sugar—depended upon investors’ ability to consolidate
large land holdings for the plantations. White advisors to the Hawaiian King pressed
their case most fervently in the 1840s, at a time when land fever was sweeping the
American mainland in places such as the northern coast of California and the Oregon
Territory.114 The Ali’i Nui (chiefs), however, had their doubts. The interdependence of
the native ahupua’a (communal land) system had proved itself capable of providing for
people’s needs, and the Western concepts of private ownership and sovereign, exclusive
control over individual plots were strange and forbidding.
As Kame’eleihiwa relates in her native-centered history of the Mahele, the white
business interests worked to overcome Ali’i opposition along two paths. One strategy
was to cut deals with the Ali’i that assured them of large holdings of their own under the
new system. This strategy succeeded in part for reasons of economic self-interest on the
part of the Hawaiians, but also, as Kame’eleihiwa explains, through a fortuitous (for the
whites) linguistic ambiguity. The word Mahele as used by the Westerners carried the
primary meaning of “divide,” and referred to the division of communal land rights into
privately held individual portions. In Hawaiian, however, Mahele has an additional
connotation—“to share,” as one would do with one’s food or wealth. Kame’elehiwa
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thinks it likely that Westerners took advantage of the Ali’i’s expectation that they would
continue to be able to provide unrestricted access to food for their people, because of the
Ali’i’s interpretation of the Mahele as a sharing of sovereignty over land rather than
alienating it to foreign interests who would exercise exclusive control.115
The second approach to convincing the Ali’i to cooperate in the Mahele depended
on the missionaries and was frankly racist. Calvinist missionaries who had learned the
Hawaiian language and whom the Ali’i regarded as the new kahuna (respected leaders),
carried great influence with the native chiefs. In 1846 the missionaries embarked on an
intense campaign to persuade the Ali’i that private ownership of land was in the best
interests of the common people. The message they preached, orally and through
dissemination of publications throughout the Islands, was that the native population was
declining substantially and something drastic needed to be done. Disease and economic
dislocation following the arrival of whites had, indeed, taken a drastic toll on the
population. The missionaries argued, however, that the cause of the decline lay in the
characteristics of the natives themselves. The common people, they explained, were
“licentious, indolent, improvident and ignorant.”116 The oppressive structure of
centralized land control aggravated these tendencies, the missionaries argued, and the
best way “to render them industrious, moral and happy” would be to allow them to hold
their land in fee.117 Kame’elehiwa concludes,
Once [the native common people] held their taro patches and house
lots in fee, the theory ran, [they] would have the incentive to
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become industrious, hard working, and Christian, because they
alone would receive the benefit of their labor. Once [they] became
industrious, they would give up their bad habits, save money, and
become wealthy—and the alarming decline in Hawaiian
population would be halted. This latter point was perhaps the one
that most influenced the Mo’i [kings] and Ali’i Nui.118
C. The Overthrow of 1893
U.S. business interests “plucked the Hawaiian pear” in January, 1893 in a coup
d’état supported by U.S. armed forces. Prior to the overthrow, the Western planters and
businessmen had intimidated Queen Lili’uokalani’s predecessor, King Kalakaua, into
accepting “the Bayonet Constitution”—a set of governmental “reforms” that effectively
placed Hawaii under the Westerners’ control. The new Constitution also extended voting
rights for the first time to American and European males, regardless of citizenship, and
instituted new property requirements that effectively excluded Native Hawaiians from
voting for a newly formed House of Nobles.119 When the Queen attempted to restore the
previous constitution of Hawaii, the Americans had the pretext they were looking for to
form a Committee of Safety and, with the backing of the U.S. armed forces coming from
ships in Honolulu Harbor, force the Queen’s abdication.
Western historians have characterized the overthrow as a triumph of democratic
values over native despotism. On one hand they have emphasized that the Queen’s
efforts to revert to the prior constitution would have nullified the vote for American and
European males. The Committee of Safety thus appears bent on preserving the franchise
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for non-Hawaiians, in the spirit of democracy.120 On the other hand, Western historians
paint an unflattering portrait of the Queen. As Silva points out, these historians rely on
English-language newspapers and the memoirs of the planters in their descriptions of the
Queen as lazy, autocratic, and ineffectual.121 One author, Lawrence Fuchs, characterizes
the overthrow as a “revolution,”122 and the major chronicler of these events, William
Adam Russ, begins his account by observing, “Lili’uokalani was not a good Queen. That
is certain.”123 Furthermore, Russ
accepts without question [an American diplomat’s] report that the
Queen, if restored, would have had [sugar baron Sanford] Dole and
the others beheaded. (Queen Lili’uokalani strenuously objected on
numerous occasions that she had said no such thing.) He also
concludes that the coup of 1893 was justified because “there can
be no doubt that Royal Government under Kalakaua and
Lili’uokalani was inefficient corrupt, and undependable.”124
D. Hawaiians’ “Consent” to Annexation
In 1897, 21,269 Hawaiians signed an anti-annexation petition that they presented
to the American government in Washington. Even residents of the leper colony on
Molokai added their signatures.125 The petition is one dramatic piece of evidence of
steadfast local opposition to the Americans’ plan to take formal dominion over the

120

See, e.g., 3 RALPH KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 402; cited by Hawaiian Advisory
Committee, supra note 3, at 5, n. 33.
121

Silva, supra note 19, at 165.

122

LAWRENCE FUCHS, HAWAII PONO “HAWAII THE EXCELLENT: AN ETHNIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY
(1961), quoted by Silva, supra note 19, at 166.
123

WILLIAM ADAM RUSS, JR., THE HAWAIIAN REPUBLIC (1894-1898) AND ITS STRUGGLE TO WIN
ANNEXATION (1992), quoted by Silva, supra note 19, at 166-167.
124

Id. at 167.

125

Silva, supra note 19, at 149.

43

Islands. Similar evidence abounds in the archives of the local press, in broadsides and
placards, and even in popular song.126 And yet, as Noenoe K. Silva argues, native
resistance to the occupation is practically invisible in the dominant Western histories of
this period. The major reasons for this invisibility are related: first, colonialist historians,
as suggested by Ngugi and Memmi, are determined to erase native resistance so as to
reassure the colonizer that he was welcomed as a savior or hero; and, second, almost all
126
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the evidence of resistance is in the Hawaiian language, which most Western historians
could not (and still cannot) read.127
The suppression of the Hawaiian language and its replacement with English was
the official policy of the Republic of Hawaii beginning in1896. Whereas there had been
77 Hawaiian-language schools in the Islands, only one remained after the 1896 law.128 It
would not be legal to teach Hawaiian in the public schools of Hawaii again until 1986.129
The dislocation, disempowerment, and humiliation of native language
suppression—articulated by Ngugi and Memmi—did not appear to trouble the
Westerners who maintained the policy for almost a century. This excerpt from the Board
of Education’s report to the Legislature in 1896 clearly conveys the colonialist attitude:
Schools taught in the Hawaiian language have virtually ceased to
exist and will probably never appear again in a Government report.
Hawaiian parents without exception prefer that their children
should be educated in the English language. The gradual
extinction of a Polynesian dialect may be regretted for sentimental
reasons, but it is certainly for the interest of the Hawaiians
themselves.130
That the Board of Education so readily concluded that the extinction of the Hawaiian
language was a benefit to native students stands as a tribute to the malign efficacy of the
colonialist discourses that prevailed at this time.
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E. The End of U.N. Status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory
A final example of the colonialist historian’s effort to render native Hawaiians as
passive, grateful beneficiaries of Western domination is the United States’ assertion that
by voting for Statehood in 1959 the Hawaiians renounced any claims or desires for
independence and sovereignty. From 1946 to 1959 Hawaii had been included on the
United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.131 Under international law,
inhabitants of these territories have a right to self-determination, and the indigenous
peoples in the territories enjoy internationally recognized rights to self-determination that
are separate from the rights of colonized peoples.132
The United Nations Fourth Committee adopted a resolution in 1953 that specified
the nature of this right to self-determination, and the “factors which should be taken into
account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government.”133 According to Resolution 742, the
population of a Non-Self-Governing Territory should be free to choose their status in
relation to the governing State, through “informed and democratic processes.”134
Inhabitants should be free to choose from a range of possibilities, “including
independence,” although “it is recognized that self-government can also be achieved by

131

Trask, supra note 4, at 236.

132

Jon M. Van Dyke, et al, Self-Determination for Nonself-Governing Peoples and for Indigenous
Peoples: The Case for Guam and Hawaii, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623 (1996).

133

U.N. General Assembly Fourth Committee Resolution 742 (VIII), Factors which should be taken into
account in deciding whether a Territory is or is not a Territory whose people have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government, November 27, 1953, item 33.

134

Id.

46

association with another State or group of States if this is done freely and on the basis of
absolute equality.”135
The United States moved to de-list Hawaii as a Non-Self-Governing Territory
after the 1959 Statehood vote, arguing that Hawaiians had fulfilled the U.N. mandate by
voting yes to Statehood.136 And, indeed, a free choice to associate with the United States
via Statehood is one of the alternatives included in Resolution 742. The Hawaiian vote in
1959 was deficient, however, in two significant ways that the United States version of
events ignores. First, the plebiscite in 1959 offered voters only two choices: the status
quo (remaining as a Territory as had been the case since the Overthrow and Annexation),
or Statehood. Under the United Nations system, voters should have had the opportunity
to choose other forms of relationship as well, “including independence.”137
The second deficiency concerns the inclusion in the electorate of 1959 of all U.S.
citizens who had resided in Hawaii for one year. Outside of Hawaii, settler populations
have been barred from participation in decolonization plebiscites. The result in Hawaii
was, in Anaya’s words, that “plebiscite procedures allowed the majority settler
population to overpower the voice of the Native Hawaiian people who were uniquely
interested in a Hawaii reconstituted in accordance with self-determination values.”138
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IV. The Incorporation of the Colonialist Narrative in Rice v. Cayetano
The Supreme Court’s core holding in Rice v. Cayetano was that the State of
Hawaii had used “Hawaiian ancestry” as “a proxy for race,”139 and therefore violated the
15th Amendment to the Constitution when it limited the electorate for the OHA board of
trustees to people of Hawaiian ancestry.140 The Court declined to hold that native
Hawaiians have a special political relationship with the United States analogous to Native
American Indians.141 Without such a special relationship, the Court subjected the racebased voting requirement to strict scrutiny, rather than evaluating it, as the Ninth Circuit
had previously done, for its rational relationship to the state’s effort to redress the Native
Hawaiians’ loss of sovereignty to the United States.142
The legal grounds for the Court’s substantive holding, its application of strict
scrutiny to Native Hawaiian preferences in a number of policy areas, as well as the
question of Native Hawaiians’ “special relationship,” have all been subject to voluminous
commentary.143 My purpose in this paper is narrower. It is to identify points in the Rice
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opinion where the Court incorporates the colonialist narrative of Hawaiian history, and to
suggest how the Court’s perspective interacts with the narrative of constitutional
colorblindness.
Chris Iijima has carried out the most thorough critique of the historical aspects of
the Rice opinion.144 Building on Iijima’s analysis I will identify several historical
assumptions in the Rice majority’s opinion. We can then see, in the light of the foregoing
theoretical and historical discussions, how incorporation of these assumptions in the
Court’s narrative enshrined an oppressive colonialist regime in the highest law of our
land.
A. The Court’s View of Hawaii’s History
The Rice majority prefaced its legal analysis with an overview of Hawaiian
history. In introducing its version of events, the Court took pains to portray itself as
steering a neutral ground between other versions that might have political or ideological
agendas. “Historians and other scholars who write of Hawaii,” the Court observed, “will
have a different purpose and more latitude than do we. They may draw judgments either
more laudatory or more harsh than the ones to which we refer.”145 The Court’s “limited
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role,” it explained, “is to recount events as understood by the lawmakers, thus ensuring
that we accord proper appreciation to their purposes in adopting the policies and laws at
issue.”146 Under this bland, non-ideological cloak, the Court smuggled into its opinion a
number of assumptions and biases that fit squarely within the colonialist narrative. These
include: (1) characterization of the white residents of Hawaii as “settlers” rather than
“immigrants”; (2) condescending depictions of indigenous society compared to
valorizing depictions of Christian missionaries and white business interests; and (3)
minimizing almost to the point of denial the U.S. role in the illegal overthrow of the
Queen, thereby evading the central findings of Congress in the Apology Resolution.
1. White “settlers”
At two points in the opinion’s opening sections the Court betrays its ideologically
tinged view of the status of white residents of Hawaii. At the very beginning, the Court
describes petitioner Harold Rice as “a citizen of Hawaii and thus himself a Hawaiian in a
well-accepted sense of the term.”147 Of course, the sense in which Rice’s “Hawaiianness” is “well-accepted” is the very essence of the dispute underlying the case. The
Court’s use of the phrase “well-accepted” signals its unwillingness to examine critically
(or even to notice) how Western pretensions to “Hawaiian-ness” invalidate the central
claim of the Native Hawaiians in the litigation, namely, that they are a separate,
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indigenous people whose sovereignty white Westerners simply ignored when they took
over the Hawaiians’ land and obliterated their culture.148
The Court reinforces this bias at the conclusion of its historical review. The Court
notes the succession of immigrant groups that came to Hawaii to work in the sugar fields:
“Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos [each of whom] has had its own history in
Hawaii, its own struggles with societal and official discrimination, its own successes, and
its own role in creating the present society of the islands.”149 This passage introduces two
types of bias into the opinion. First, as Iijima notes, the list of “immigrants” tellingly
leaves out the whites!150 In the Court’s narrative, the white missionaries and businessmen
who took absolute control of the indigenous society appear not as two more outsider
groups, but as part of the earlier “settler” population on a par with the Hawaiians
themselves. Second, by elevating the struggles with discrimination of the Chinese,
Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos, the Court manages to reduce the Native Hawaiians
to the level of one interest group among others, deftly evading the fundamental question
of the Hawaiians’ loss of sovereignty over their one and only homeland.
2. The indigenous society and its white benefactors
The biases in the Court’s depiction of pre-contact Hawaii are by turns subtle and
glaring. A subtle bias is the Court’s preference for the population estimates of precontact Hawaii made by “some modern historians” that place it between 200,000 and
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300,000.151 As noted above, not only are these figures at the low end even of most
Western historians’ estimates, they are drastically below the estimates of 800,000 to one
million suggested by archaeological and anthropological evidence.152 Even though the
opinion later acknowledges that the population declined due to disease,153 the Court has
softened the impact of that decline considerably by choosing the lower starting figure.
Nothing is subtle about the Court’s condescending statement that “accounts of
Hawaiian [pre-contact] life often remark upon the people’s capacity to find beauty and
pleasure in their island existence, but life was not altogether idyllic.”154 Like a theater
manager arranging the set for a morality play, the Court here brings on stage the
childlike, primitive natives on the eve of their discovery by the forces of civilization.
Then, as if discovering an aspect of Hawaiian history totally unlike anything that could
be associated with Europe, the Court continues, “the islands were ruled by four different
kings, and intra-Hawaiian wars could inflict great loss and suffering.”155 Lest readers
miss the inherent barbarism and depravity of indigenous society, the Court adds that these
kings or other chieftains “could order death or sacrifice of any subject.”156
The Christian missionaries, on the other hand, despite their historical role as the
vanguard of an intrusive and finally dominant Western invasion force, appear to the
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Court as seeking “to teach Hawaiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs that were
contrary to Christian teachings and practices.”157 The white interests who took total
control of the land and power structure of the Islands had, in the anodyne words of the
Court, “increasing involvement…in the economic and political affairs of the
Kingdom.”158 The principal arena for white conquest, of course, was land. But the Court
adopts a view of the land transfer that sees it, not as native dispossession and the
disruption of a centuries-old system of interdependence of Ali’i and commoner, but as an
extension of “rights” and the overthrow of “feudalism.”159 The Court further states, with
no supporting evidence and in the face of the strong evidence to the contrary presented by
Kame’elehiwa and other local historians, “Westerners were not the only ones with
pressing concerns, however, for the disposition and ownership of land came to be an
unsettled matter among the Hawaiians themselves.”160
This is a familiar pattern of colonialist rationalization of conquest, as depicted by
Memmi. The colonizers portray the colonized as backward, passive, barbaric, and
confused. The colonizer is beneficent, civilized, and eager to extend “rights” where
heretofore the natives have known only subservience to feudal powers exercised by kings
and chieftains who (unlike the colonizers) wield arbitrary, death-dealing power.
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3. The overthrow
It is also a mainstay of colonialist history to depict the ultimate act of conquest as
a liberation. Given the findings of President Cleveland in the aftermath of the overthrow
of Queen Lili’uokalani,161 and the text of the Apology Resolution which acknowledges
“the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people” and “the
participation of agents and citizens of the United States [in] the deprivation of the rights
of Native Hawaiians to self-determination,”162 it would seem difficult for the Court to
perform such interpretive prestidigitation. Yet, in two key sentences, the opinion attempts
precisely that.
First, in an allusion to the events surrounding the Bayonet Constitution that barely
acknowledges the intimidation of King Kalakaua, the Court reports that “Westerners
forced the resignation of the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the adoption
of a new Constitution, which, among other things, reduced the power of the monarchy
and extended the right to vote to non-Hawaiians.”163 When the Court adverts to the
overthrow of the Queen, it portrays it as a “response to an attempt by the then-Hawaiian
monarch, Queen Lili’uokalani, to promulgate a new constitution restoring monarchical
control over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian subjects.”164
In two swift strokes the Court re-writes history. Western business interests were
the saviors of democracy, and the Queen—who in fact was acting to reassert the
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legitimate and established order of native society after its usurpation by those Western
interests a few years before—was a reactionary agent of tyranny. Of course, neither
President Cleveland nor the authors of the Apology Resolution interpreted events this
way. The Court, however, gives very short shrift to their perspectives. While
acknowledging that Cleveland was “unimpressed and indeed offended by the actions of
the American Minister,” and that he “called for the restoration of the Hawaiian
monarchy,” the Court weakly and vaguely notes that “the Queen could not resume her
former place [and]...abdicated the throne a year later.”165 As for the findings of the
Apology Resolution, the Court’s entire consideration of them appears in the following
passage:
In 1993, a century after the intervention of the Committee of
Safety, the Congress of the United States reviewed this history, and
in particular the role of Minister Stevens. Congress passed a Joint
Resolution recounting the events in some detail and offering an
apology to the Hawaiian people.166
The opinion leaves opaque what the grounds for apology could possibly be.
According to the Court’s construction of events, the Committee of Safety had preserved
democracy and thwarted the tyrannical designs of the Queen. Yet the Court is untroubled
by the contradiction, a sign that the colonialist historian’s work of effacement and erasure
of embarrassing or troubling facts has been very effective.
B. Race
It is ironic that the Court’s highly racialized history is a prelude to a ruling that
race has no permissible place in the State of Hawaii’s efforts to ameliorate the Native
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Hawaiians’ dispossession. Gotanda’s analysis of the multiple meanings of “race” throws
light on the apparent contradiction, and on the double bind in which the Native
Hawaiians find themselves when they turn to the legal system for redress. In Gotanda’s
terms, the Rice opinion inappropriately conflates and confuses formal-race and historicalrace. When the Court applies the test of race-consciousness to the OHA voting
requirement and finds it in violation of the 15th Amendment, it is construing race as
formal-race. This usage divorces the Hawaiians from their history of political and
cultural dispossession at the hands of whites. To do justice to this history, the Court
would have to emphasize and acknowledge historical-race, which “embodies past and
continuing racial subordination, and is the meaning of race that the Court contemplates
when it applies ‘strict scrutiny’ to racially disadvantaging government conduct.”167
The Court’s confusion, and its invidious effects on the Native Hawaiians, appear
most clearly in two sentences from the Rice opinion. To the Court, Hawaiian ancestry is
a “proxy for race” because the drafters of the laws at issue in Rice sought to “emphasiz[e]
the unique culture of the ancient Hawaiians…[and] preserve that commonality of people
to the present day.”168 Yet only a few paragraphs later the Court inveighs against “race”
because it “demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of
by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”169 That the Court can move in such a
short space from recognizing ancestry as worthy of respect, and as the source of the
Hawaiian people’s identity and dignity, to condemning the identification of a people by
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their ancestry as “demeaning,” signals profound conceptual confusion. The Hawaiians
pay a steep price for the Court’s confusion. It is nothing less than that the Court attaches
equal opprobrium to race-consciousness that oppresses and degrades a people, and to
race-consciousness that attempts to right grievous historical wrongs.
Summarizing these effects of Rice, and the racial confusion from which they flow,
Mahealani Kamau’u offered this testimony at the 2000 Community Forum held by the
Hawaii Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights:
In rendering its opinion, the High Court chose to apply the law as
though entirely separate from the cultural, political, and economic
context within which OHA’s voting process was created. That
context largely is the result of America’s misdeeds and the Hawaii
electorate’s desire to make amends. The Court appears to have
been influenced by the increasingly dominant discourse of neoconservatism, which has emphasized the need for strictly colorblind policies, calling for repeal of special treatment such as
affirmative action and other race-remedial policies. Under this
doctrine, implicit assumptions regarding race include beliefs that
any race consciousness is discrimination, that race is biological and
thus a concept devoid of historical, cultural, or social content, and
that a group is either racial or it is not. And if it is racial, it cannot
be characterized as political. This approach allows America to
ignore its historical oppression of Native Hawaiians when meting
out justice in its courts of law.170
Kamau’u’s comment shows how colonialist historical narrative and today’s
narrative of colorblindness reinforce each other. In the Rice opinion, the narratives work
together to erase almost all historical traces of Western race-based usurpation and
dispossession of Native Hawaiians. The Court’s selective and biased historical reporting,
despite the initial disavowal of any ideological purpose, perpetuates colonialist
condescension toward native peoples; avoids the most uncomfortable facts concerning a
near-genocidal population decline; glosses over the cunning manipulation of natives who
170
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were unfamiliar with Western constructs of private property; and depicts the agents of the
overthrow of the legitimate government of Hawaii as liberators and defenders of
democratic rule. In Ferguson’s terms, we cannot but suspect that the history that is
absent from the Court’s narrative has not merely been omitted; it has been forcibly
suppressed.171
The formal-race analysis of the OHA’s voting requirement reinforces the Court’s
“structural amnesia.”172 The Court’s reliance on formal-race denies history. And, by
emptying “race” of any historical content, the Court achieves two ends simultaneously.
First, it conflates racial preferences that oppress with racial preferences that attempt to
redress oppression. Second, it reads out of its legal analysis the historical record that lay
at the heart of the Apology Resolution. The Rice opinion, and the rhetorical and
analytical frameworks it embodies, call into question the prospects for Native Hawaiians
to achieve justice within the U.S. justice system.

V. Conclusion: Resisting Law as an Instrument of Colonial Domination
McHugh’s analysis of the various forms of colonialist “lawfare against the
tribes”173 laid a foundation for critical counterattack, and depicted Western legalism as “a
site of intercultural struggle and contestation.”174 I have argued that the U.S. justice
system is structurally and systematically biased against the claims of Native Hawaiians,
and perhaps against the claims of other indigenous peoples as well. The workings of
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narrative in the law render the law itself an instrument of colonial domination. At the
same time, however, the analysis suggests three potential avenues of resistance: (1)
reclaiming and restoring the suppressed native voice; (2) continuing critical appraisal of
the justice system’s use of “race”; and (3) recourse to international law.
A. Reclaiming the Suppressed Native Voice
As we have seen, a colonialist historical narrative has played a major role in
stifling the native voice at the U.S. Supreme Court. That narrative skews the Court’s
framing of the issues before it, and forecloses consideration of uncomfortable facts that
would call into question not only the Court’s conceptual frame, but the justice of its
holdings. Accordingly, a remedy at this level will be to insist even more strenuously on
the inclusion of the native historical voice in the Court’s construction of the historical
record. In the Hawaiian case, this will entail more reconstruction of the historical record
of the sort undertaken by writers such as Iijima, Yamamoto, Trask, Kame’elehiwa, and
Silva.
This approach should also set the Hawaiian example beside the treatment at law,
and in American culture generally, of the Native American Indian. This is particularly
apt in light of the (so far failed) attempt by Native Hawaiians to persuade the Supreme
Court of the validity of the analogy between their “special relationship” with the
government and that of the Indian tribes. Robert Williams’ The American Indian in
Western Legal Thought is both a resource and model for this approach.175
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This task will entail the careful examination of a court’s historical narrative for
traces of what Ngugi calls “the cultural bomb.”176 A court’s narrative is never neutral,
notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s disclaimer at the beginning of his opinion in Rice v.
Cayetano.177 “The power to narrate,” Said wrote, “or to block other narratives from
forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one
of the main connections between them.”178 The Rice opinion epitomized this connection.
As Delgado has pointed out, however, the power to block a narrative may be
exerted at the initial trial level as well.179 In the Hawaiian case, resistance to this
phenomenon might well require that the Native Hawaiian experience of cultural
devaluation and stereotyping, as captured in Hall’s depiction of “kitsch,”180 and the
everyday micro-aggressions that native Hawaiians encounter in contemporary Hawaii, be
accorded greater weight as part of the presentation of grievances in court. To gain a
hearing for this experience at the trial level, the challenge is to make manifest and overt
the harms caused by unconscious racism. As Joel Kovel181 and Charles Lawrence182 have
argued, unconscious racism perpetuates micro-aggression and subordination without the
telltale markers of “intent” to discriminate (Lawrence) or the blatant forms of
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“assaultive” racism (Kovel) that courts are more willing to acknowledge. Trial attorneys
litigating indigenous claims must be vigilant to assure that the accounts and stories that
find their way into the trial record, and set the stage for appellate review, are those of the
clients themselves, and not a distorted Westernized version.183
B. Critical Appraisal of “Race” in U.S. Jurisprudence
Neil Gotanda points the way to heightened awareness of how courts’ use of
formal-race freezes in place opportunities and distributions of resources that favor the
white majority. He makes the further point that narrative reinforces the oppressive
effects of a court’s choice of analytic frameworks. Thus, as a strategy of resistance, the
actual flesh-and-blood stories that saturate historical-race are necessary complements to
183
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Gotanda’s theoretical analysis. Ferguson’s use of the story of Gabriel’s rebellion,184 and
Ross’s delving into the “rhetorical tapestry of race”185 exemplify a narrative-rich
approach to exposing the oppressive effects of courts’ use of formal-race when assessing
policies designed to counter the effects of historical racism.
C. The International Law Arena
As Haunani-Kay Trask observes,
Conflict over Native sovereignty is not unique to Hawaiians. It is
repeated throughout the Pacific Islands, indeed anywhere in the
world where Native peoples suffer the yoke of oppression. Like
Tahitians, Kanaks, Maori, Australian Aborigines, Palestinians, the
Kurdish peoples, Tibetans, the Maya, Quechua, and many other
indigenous peoples, Native Hawaiians continue to struggle for selfdetermination and self-preservation as a people.186
More than a simple call for international solidarity, Trask’s observation points to
the international human rights arena as a third avenue of resistance to the recalcitrance of
the America legal system when it comes to breaking the bonds of the colonialist
narrative. Indeed, given how solidly the colonialist narrative is entrenched in American
law, an advocate for Native Hawaiian sovereignty is justifiably pessimistic that domestic
legal remedies are anywhere near at hand. In this environment, an effort to reinscribe the
Hawaiian Islands on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories is an
appropriate strategy.187 In Trask’s words,
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Civil rights must be subsumed under human rights; land claims,
language transmission, and monetary compensation must be
understood and argued in terms of our human rights as indigenous
people rather than merely as citizens of the United States or the
state of Hawaii. Given that Hawaiians were once self-governing
under the Kingdom of Hawaii and given that the United States,
through its diplomatic and military offices, played a central role in
the overthrow of that Kingdom, our historical injury involves
violation of international law. Thus the context of the U.S.
constitution is too small a framework in which to argue for
sovereignty. An international frame of reference, one that involves
universal human rights, must be the context for discussion.188
Two further arguments from contemporary history support an internationalist turn
to the Native Hawaiians’ anti-colonialist struggle. First, McHugh has documented a
number of successes of similar movements around the globe during what he has termed
the “jurisprudence of reconciliation” that marked the 1990s.189 The Draft United Nations
Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, agreed upon in July, 1993,
by the members of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations190 is further
evidence of a possibly more hospitable international climate for Native Hawaiian claims.
A second argument derives from Derrick Bell’s thesis of “interest convergence.”
According to Bell, African American political and legal gains in the United States have
occurred not because of whites’ recognition of the moral force of African Americans’
arguments for justice, but because an appearance of black progress serves the interests of
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white elites.191 The prime example of this, Bell argues, is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education to jettison the separate but equal doctrine in the case of
public schools. The Court did not suddenly discover the injustice of segregation, Bell
argues; rather, the United States could no longer afford the embarrassment of a flagrantly
oppressed minority population in the midst of a world-wide competition with the Soviet
Union for the allegiance of Third World countries during the Cold War.192 Richard
Delgado has proposed that blacks and other minorities stand to make similar gains at a
time when the United States is engaged in its self-proclaimed “War on Terrorism,” and is
competing with Islamic fundamentalism for the hearts and minds of moderate forces
across the Muslim world.193 An appeal in the international arena for justice for the
dispossessed Native Hawaiians may gain traction as the U.S. strives to appear responsive
to the claims of oppressed peoples everywhere, and perhaps even contrite about its
colonial past.
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The international arena is not a panacea. International law forums are hardly
immune to colonialist modes of thought. Furthermore, even if international judgments
are favorable to an indigenous people, their effect will depend on state actors’ willingness
to implement them.194 Nevertheless, a narrative perspective on the rights of indigenous
peoples suggests a distinct advantage in placing the cause of the Native Hawaiians (or,
indeed, of any single people) on the international stage, in solidarity with other peoples.
On that stage, amplified by the parallel stories of other peoples who have experienced
colonial domination, the native voice is louder, its timbre richer, its claim to attention
more insistent.
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